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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
speech. The importance of allowing a free flow of commercial
information will have to be weighed against the importance of
the restriction which is being challenged. This must be done on
a case by case basis, and the weighing process should involve
consideration of the factors which have been outlined above.
Another case involving commercial speech has been appealed
to the Supreme Court, and hopefully it will give the Court an
opportunity to elaborate on the Virginia Citizens rationale."5
However, it appears today that the Court is unwilling to give
the fullest measure of first amendment protection to commer-
cial speech.
PAUL M. LOHMANN
Constitutional Law-Federal Civil Rights Act-Absolute
Immunity Extended to Prosecuting Attorney-In the recent
case of Imbler v. Pachtman,' the United States Supreme Court
held that a prosecuting attorney, acting within the scope of his
duties in initiating and prosecuting a case, has absolute im-
munity from liability for damages for alleged violations of an-
other's constitutional rights under section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act. 2 In so holding the court further limited the effect
of section 1983 in civil tort actions and elevated the position of
prosecuting attorney to the same protected status enjoyed by
judges3 and grand jurors4 acting within the scope of their du-
ties. This article will discuss the decision and attempt to ana-
76. Population Services Int'l v. Wilson, 398 F. Supp. 321, 337 (S.D. N.Y. 1975)
prob. juris. noted Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 96 S. Ct. 2621 (1976).
1. 96 S. Ct. 982 (1976).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) was originally passed as § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1871, 17 Stat. 13, and reads in full:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depri-
vation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
3. See, e.g., Francis v. Crafts, 203 F.2d 809 (1st Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
835 (1953); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1871).




lyze its impact on the role of the prosecutor and upon those
wronged through prosecutorial misconduct.
The decision of this case marks the apparent end of peti-
tioner Imbler's lengthy odyssey through the California state
and federal courts. The series of events leading to this point
date back to an attempted armed robbery of a Los Angeles
market in 1961 which resulted in the fatal shooting of the
store's proprietor. Paul Imbler was involved in an attempted
robbery in Pomona, California, a short time thereafter. The
day following the Pomona robbery, he turned himself in as an
accomplice to that crime. After an investigation, the Los Ange-
les District Attorney's office charged Imbler with first-degree
murder for the Los Angeles market shooting.
At the trial, the State produced identification testimony of
one Alfred Costello, who identified Imbler as the gunman at the
Los Angeles market. As a defense, Imbler offered the alibi of
having spent the night in question touring bars with several
friends. The jury rejected Imbler's alibi, found him guilty as
charged and fixed punishment at death. On appeal, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the lower court
decision.5
Later that year, Pachtman, the prosecutor at Imbler's trial,
wrote a letter to the Governor of California in which he de-
scribed evidence which corroborated Imbler's alibi. He also
disclosed revelations which impeached the credibility of Cos-
tello's identification testimony. Shortly after this letter, Imbler
filed a state habeas corpus petition which was unanimously
denied by the Supreme Court of California.'
One year later, in 1964, Imbler succeeded in having his
death sentence overturned on grounds unrelated to the instant
action.' Imbler was then sentenced to life imprisonment and no
further action was taken until three years later, when he filed
a federal habeas corpus petition. The petition was based on the
same grounds which the Supreme Court of California had ear-
lier rejected.8 The district court viewed the record quite differ-
ently than the California court and issued the writ The State
5. People v. Imbler, 57 Cal. 2d 711, 21 Cal. Rptr. 568, 371 P.2d 304 (1962).
6. In re Imbler, 60 Cal. 2d 554, 35 Cal. Rptr. 293, 387 P.2d 6 (1963). See also
Bergeson, California Prisoners: Rights Without Remedies, 25 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1972).
7. In re Imbler, 61 Cal. 2d 556, 39 Cal. Rptr. 375, 393 P.2d 687 (1964).
8. See 60 Cal. 2d at 557, 566-68, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 296-98, 387 P.2d at 7-11.
9. Imbler v. Craven, 298 F. Supp. 795 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
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then appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals"0 which
affirmed the district court's decision." The State's petition for
certiorari was denied. 2
Thus, after a decade of confinement and court battles, Paul
Imbler was a free man. In April of 1972, Imbler filed a civil
rights action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and related statutes
against Pachtman and others involved in the investigation and
prosecution of the charges stemming from the Los Angeles rob-
bery attempt. The gravamen of Imbler's complaint against
Pachtman was that he had "with intent and on other occasions
with negligence"' 3 allowed Costello to give false testimony and
suppressed prosecution evidence which would have exonerated
Imbler from the charges against him. 4
The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that
Pachtman was immune from civil liability because the acts
complained of were within the traditional area of the prosecu-
tor's official functions. Upon Imbler's appeal, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, with one judge dissenting, af-
firmed on the basis that the alleged civil rights violations were
committed in the course of "prosecutorial activities which can
only be characterized as 'an integral part of the judicial pro-
cess'.""5 In a decision written by Justice Powell, expressing the
view of five members, the Supreme Court affirmed.
After a recital of the pertinent facts, the Court traced the
history of the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 1983
in suits against public officials. Historically, the Court has read
section 1983 in harmony with general principles of tort immun-
ities and defenses rather than in derogation of them." As a
result, the Court has accorded absolute immunity to legisla-
tors'7 and judges," and a qualified immunity to governors and
10. The State based its appeal on the claim that the district court had failed to
give appropriate deference to the factual determination of the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1970).
11. Imbler v. California, 424 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1970).
12. 400 U.S. 865 (1970).
13. 96 S. Ct. at 988.
14. Imbler alleged that Pachtman withheld the results of a lie detector test and a
fingerprint expert's evidence. He also charged Pachtman with alteration of a police
artist's sketch which was used at trial.
15. 500 F.2d 1301, 1302, quoting Marlowe v. Coakley, 404 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1968).
16. 96 S. Ct. at 989, citing Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951).
17. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
18. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1871).
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other executive officials'9 and to school officials under certain
specified circumstances. " In each instance "the considerations
underlying the nature of the immunity of the respective offi-
cials in suits at common law led to essentially the same im-
munity under § 1983."21
This case marked the first time the Court addressed the
question of a public prosecutor's liability under section 1983.21
The Court examined the record of the federal courts of appeals
on the issue of prosecutorial immunity from section 1983 suits
and found the results to be "virtually unanimous that a prose-
cutor enjoys absolute immunity from § 1983 suits for damages
when he acts within the scope of his prosecutorial duties. 2 3
However, while this statement may be generally accurate,
there have been several significant decisions holding that a
prosecutor is subject to section 1983 liability for his willful
misconduct.24 Moreover, the scope of the immunity accorded in
the majority of federal decisions, as well as the reasons given
in support of the holdings, has varied.
As a basis for its grant of immunity, the Supreme Court
relied on the policy considerations underlying the federal deci-
sions as well as those underlying the common-law immunity of
prosecuting attorneys from civil suits for malicious prosecu-
tion.25 The Court pointed to the potential detrimental effects
on the role of the prosecutor and the administration of criminal
justice which could result from a grant of qualified or limited
19. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
20. In Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975), the officials were not liable so long
as they could not reasonably have known that their action violated clearly established
constitutional rights and did not act with malicious intention to injure another. Cf.
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577 (1975).
21. 96 S. Ct. at 990.
22. However, in 1926, the Court affirmed in a memorandum opinion the decision
of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2nd Cir.
1926), which held that an assistant to the Attorney General of the United States was
immune from a civil common law action for malicious prosecution. 275 U.S. 503 (1927).
23. 96 S. Ct. at 990; see cases cited therein at note 16.
24. See, e.g., Hilliard v. Williams, 516 F.2d 1344 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated and
remanded for reconsideration in light of Imbler v. Pachtman, 96 S.Ct. 1453 (1976);
Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 776
(1947).
25. For a general discussion of these considerations, see RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §
656 (1938); Keefe, Personal Tort Liability of Administrative Officials, 12 FORDHAM L.
REV. 130 (1943); Note, Liability of Public Officials to Suit under the Civil Rights Acts,
46 COLUM. L. REv. 614 (1946).
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immunity only.2 The Court expressed the concern that poten-
tial liability would tend to inhibit the discreet prosecution of
criminal cases and that the burden of defending civil suits
would consume far too much of the frequently overtaxed time
and resources of the prosecutor's office.
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice White, joined by Jus-
tices Brennan and Marshall, agreed with the majority's result
that:
[A] prosecutor is absolutely immune from suit for money
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for presentation of testimony
later determined to have been false, where the presentation
of such testimony is alleged to have been unconstitutional
solely because the prosecutor did not believe it or should not
have believed it to be true. 7
However, the concurring justices rejected any implication that
the absolute immunity extends to suits alleging that the prose-
cutor unconstitutionally suppressed evidence.28 They con-
tended that the grant of absolute immunity was not necessary
or even helpful in protecting the judicial process. Instead, these
justices suggested that liability in damages for unconstitu-
tional or illegal conduct would have the very desirable effect of
deterring such conduct. Justice White considered that immun-
ity from suit alleging an unconstitutional suppression of evi-
dence was counterproductive, since it would discourage the
disclosure of evidence which is vital to our judicial system and
which is encouraged by rules such as the privilege accorded to
prosecutors in the law of defamation.29
The majority and concurring opinions illustrate the con-
flicting views on the necessity and utility of prosecutorial im-
26. It is important to note the procedural difference between an absolute immunity
and a qualified or limited immunity. An absolute immunity defeats a suit at its outset,
as long as the acts complained of were committed while acting within the scope of the
immunity. Whether an official is protected under a qualified immunity is dependent
upon the circumstances and motivations of his actions, and if the claim is properly
pleaded, this can often be determined only after all of the relevant evidence is intro-
duced at trial. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 320-22 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1974).
27. 96 S. Ct. at 996.
28. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (suppression of evidence bearing on
degree of crime as well as evidence bearing upon guilt is a denial of due process). See
also United States v. Poole, 379 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1967); Ashley v. Texas, 319 F.2d 80
(5th Cir. 1963). Cf. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE
DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3.11 and Commentary at 100-101 (App. Draft 1971).
29. 96 S. Ct. at 996.
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munity. Underlying this disagreement are the basic differences
of opinion with regard to the propriety of section 1983 as a basis
for civil tort actions.30 Section 1983, a long-dormant section of
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, has become the source of a flood
of private rights actions in the federal courts.3 ' Judicial malev-
olence toward the act - Justice Frankfurter once described it
as "loosely and blindly drafted" 32 - and concern for the princi-
ples of federalism3 3 has led the courts to constrict the applica-
tion of section 1983. Three principal techniques have been used
to effect this restrictive application: 34 (1) by construction of the
eleventh amendment,3 5 to prohibit section 1983 suits against
the states by a narrow interpretation of the word "person" in
the Act 3' and through the application and extension of common
law immunities as in Imbler; (2) by use of doctrines such as
abstension to avoid deciding certain actions; and (3) by the
application of the principles of res judicata to prevent collat-
eral attack of state court decisions through section 1983. 31
When viewed against the history of narrow interpretation of
the ambit of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the grant of absolute
immunity to the prosecutor is a predictable extension of past
decisions. Such a grant of immunity is likely to have both
beneficial and adverse effects on the criminal justice system:
"To be sure, this immunity does leave the genuinely wronged
30. For a good illustration of these differing opinions, see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167 (1960) (Harlan, J., concurring and Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Averitt, Federal
Section 1983 Actions after State Court Judgment, 44 COLO. L. REV. 197 (1972).
31. In McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial En-
forcement of Constitutional Protections, Part I, 60 VA. L. REV. 1 (1974), it is noted that
between the fiscal years of 1960 and 1972, the number of actions under section 1983
filed in the federal courts had increased from approximately 300 in 1960 to approxi-
mately 8,000 in 1971. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1972
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 287, Table C-2.
32. Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 121 (1951).
33. Perhaps the most articulate expression of this concern is found in Justice
Frankfurter's dissent in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 211-58 (1960). See also Aldisert,
Judicial Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's Thoughts on Section
1983, Comity and the Federal Caseload, 1973 LAw AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 557.
34. Cf. McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983, supra note 31.
35. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887).
36. For example, in Monroe v. Pape, the Court held that "person" did not include
municipal corporations, placing them outside the purview of the act. 346 U.S. at 911.
37. The judicial application of the latter two techniques, use of the abstention
doctrine and the application of principles of res judicata, is discussed extensively in
McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of
Constitutional Claims, Part II, 60 VA. L. REV. 250 (1974).
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defendant without civil redress against a prosecutor whose
malicious or dishonest action deprives him of liberty. 38
Justice White expressed the concern that such a grant of
immunity would remove a necessary deterrent to prosecutorial
malversation. The majority pointed to the fact that prosecutors
are not beyond the reach of the criminal law since they can be
punished criminally for willful deprivations of constitutional
rights based on 18 U.S.C. section 242. 31 However, actions under
section 242 have been infrequent and on its face the scope of
the statute is much narrower than that of section 1983. Section
242 has been described as "a federal criminal statute having to
do with subjecting one to a different punishment because he is
alien or because of color or race."4 Moreover, the number of
actions brought under this section is further limited by the fact
that "[a]ny charge thereunder may only be initiated by a
Federal Grand Jury or a United States Attorney."'"
Thus with the deterrent effect of section 1983 liability elimi-
nated, the already broad latitude accorded a prosecuting attor-
ney42 appears to be further extended. This is especially true in
Wisconsin where the district attorney is a constitutional offi-
cere 3 and is endowed with a discretion that approaches the
quasi-judicial." The Wisconsin Supreme Court in State ex rel.
38. Justice Powell, speaking for the majority in Imbler, 96 S. Ct. at 993.
39. Whoever under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or cus-
tom, wilfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains,
or penalties, on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his
color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined
not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if death
results shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970).
40. Kennedy v. Anderson, 373 F. Supp. 1345, 1346 (E.D. Okla. 1974).
41. Id.
42. See Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion,
19 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1971), and Brietel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27
U. CHI. L. REV. 427, 429 (1960):
Surely it must be conceded at the outset that illegal or unauthorized conduct
by public officials is a net evil, regardless of offsetting advantages. It is that, if
only because it breeds general disrespect for law. It is also that because it leads
to the unbridled and the oppressive. So too, it must be conceded that discretion
- even legally permissible discretion - involves great hazard. It makes easy
the arbitrary, the discriminatory and the oppressive. It produces inequality of
treatment. It offers a fertile bed for corruption. It is conducive to the develop-
ment of a police state - or, at least a police-minded state.
43. WIs. CONsT. art. VI, § 4.
44. State v. Pearson, 195 Wis. 351, 359, 218 N.W. 367, 370 (1928).
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Kurkierewicz v. Cannon45 held that performance of the district
attorney's function, being of a discretionary nature, could not
be compelled by mandamus:
[T]he district attorney is not answerable to any other officer
of the state in respect to the manner in which he exercises
those powers. True, he is answerable to the people, for if he
fails in his trust he can be recalled or defeated at the polls.
In the event he wilfully fails to perform his duties or is in-
volved in crime, he may be suspended from office by the
governor and removed for cause. These, however, are political
remedies that go not to directing the performance of specific
duties but rather go to the question of fitness for office."
It would appear that in Wisconsin the threat of guberna-
torial removal is the only truly operative deterrent against
wrongful conduct on the part of the district attorney during the
course of his term. A John Doe investigation of a prosecutor's
activities "is a feeble investigative device indeed, unless both
the district attorney and the magistrate are amenable to using
their offices in furtherance of the investigation."4 The magis-
trate at a John Doe proceeding is only obligated to hear the
complainant and his witnesses. Only at the district attorney's
request, and subject to the magistrate's discretion, may other
witnesses be subpoenaed and examined."48
The other supposed deterrent to prosecutorial malfeasance
is the threat of defeat at the polls. The effect of this deterrent
on official conduct is questionable for two reasons: (1) defeat
at the polls removes the official at the expiration of his term
in office; it is of no concern to those officials not seeking re-
election; (2) the reputation of the prosecutor and his popularity
at the polls is often linked to his ability to obtain convictions;
and this fact may actually encourage the self-serving official to
use unconstitutional means to secure convictions. Thus, the
security of the citizenry from illicit activities on the part of
district and prosecuting attorneys is only as sound as the integ-
rity of those who hold the office.
Unfortunately, history has shown that dishonest men have
45. 42 Wis. 2d 368, 166 N.W.2d 255 (1969); cf. Thompson v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 325,
212 N.W.2d 109 (1973).
46. Id. at 378-79, 166 N.W.2d at 260.
47. Id. at 377, 166 N.W.2d at 259.
48. Id. Cf. Wis. STAT. § 968.26 (1973).
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occupied the position of prosecutor all too often.49 Absolute
immunity forecloses any possibility that those genuinely and
intentionally wronged through prosecutorial misconduct may
be recompensed for their anguish or wrongful imprisonment.
The majority in Imbler felt that this situation was unfortunate
but necessary in order to serve "the broader public interest."5
The number of people who will be left without redress for civil
rights violations as a result of this decision is small when com-
pared to the general populace. However, a significant number
of individuals are today denied any compensation for serious
deprivations of rights as a result of the consistently constrictive
interpretation of section 1983 by the federal and supreme
courts.5 Today, section 1983, once a watchdog over private
rights, retains its bark in theory but in practice carries a feeble
bite.
Thus, it is evident that under our present system an equita-
ble answer "must be found in a balance between the evils inevi-
table in either alternative"5 of denying those wronged their
just compensation or impeding the orderly performance of gov-
ernmental functions. Judge Woodbury of the First Circuit
Court of Appeals in his concurring opinion in Kelly v. Dunne
suggested a procedure to be used in civil rights actions against
public officials.5 3 He proposed that officials be granted a condi-
tional immunity by permitting an action only upon a clear
showing of "malice, corruption, or cruelty" and "ruthless indif-
ference to a citizen's rights."5 The official's time would be
protected by providing for summary judgment for the defen-
dant unless the plaintiff could produce solid evidence that the
officer's acts were in excess of his powers and inspired by bad
faith.
49. The cases illustrating this point are far too numerous to list. For examples of
prosecutorial impropriety see Hilliard v. Williams, 516 F.2d 1344 (6th Cir. 1975),
vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Imbler v. Pachtman, 96 S.Ct.
1453 (1976), wherein the prosecutor directed a law enforcement officer to give false
testimony implying that stains on the accused's jacket were blood, and withheld an
F.B.I. report which showed that such stains were not blood, in order to obtain a murder
conviction, and United States v. Poole, 379 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1967), where the prosecu-
tor knowingly withheld a physician's report that the alleged rape victim had not had
sexual intercourse.
50. 96 S. Ct. at 993.
51. McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983, supra note 31.
52. 96 S. Ct. at 994, quoting Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Gregoire v. Biddle,
177 F.2d 579, 581, cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
53. 344 F.2d 129 (1st Cir. 1965).
54. Id. at 135.
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Another alternative5 to absolute immunity would be to pre-
serve the immunities and good faith defenses of public officials
and still provide a compensatory remedy to citizens harmed by
unconstitutional actions of the officials. This system would
require an abrogation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity to
allow suits against the appropriate governmental entity with-
out subjecting the individual officers to personal liability for
their mistakes of judgment. Such a reparations system, some-
what akin to the vicarious liability arising under the doctrine
of respondeat superior, would: (1) avoid the chilling effects on
public service; (2) provide just reparations for those genuinely
wronged through official misconduct; (3) be a more likely vehi-
cle for effecting necessary systemic and institutional changes
than liability on the part of the individual officer. 6
In his dissenting opinion in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics," Chief Justice Burger
recommended a system of reparations for those suffering dam-
ages as a result of illegal searches and seizures. His recommen-
dation, which could be applied to other civil rights violations
at the hands of public officials, called for the enactment of
legislation by Congress which would: (1) waive sovereign im-
munity as to unconstitutional acts of officials committed in the
performance of assigned duties, (2) create a cause of action for
damages resulting from such acts, and (3) create a quasi-
judicial tribunal to adjudicate the claims for such damages. 8
Each of these three proposals has merit. Each seeks to rem-
edy a situation which has presented the courts with the necess-
ity of making difficult choices between the conflicting policies,
of compensation for those wronged on the one hand and re-
moval of impediments to the orderly and efficient operation of
vital public functions on the other. The case of Imbler v.
Pachtman is significant for the expansive effect it will have on
prosecutorial discretion and for the impact it will have on those
wronged through illicit action on the part of a prosecutor. How-
ever, the most important message of this case is that legislative
action on the part of Congress is required to resolve the difficult
55. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARv. L.
REV. 1532 (1972).
56. Id. at 1555-58.
57. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
58. Id. at 422-23.
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problems which face the courts in deciding cases under section
1983. The statute for all practical purposes is overly broad. In
response to this, the courts have given the section such restric-
tive interpretation as to render it ineffective. Only through a
redrafting of section 1983 or through additional definitive legis-
lation can an equitable balance be struck between the conflict-
ing policies of just compensation for those genuinely deprived
of protected rights and freedom from undue burdens on effi-
cient performance by public officials.
PATRICK R. GRIFFEN
Constitutional Law-Fourteenth Amendment Due Pro-
cess-Availability of Federal Remedies-Reputation as a
Protected Interest-In Paul v. Davis,' the United States Su-
preme Court considered whether a person's reputation was a
liberty interest protected by the fourteenth amendment.2 In
holding that the scope of 42 U.S.C. section 19831 does not ex-
tend to defamation by a municipal police department, the
Court has significantly changed its approach to civil liberties
questions and has restricted the availability of federal forums
for the litigation of those questions. Paul v. Davis contradicts
many well established principles of civil liberties law. Numer-
ous weaknesses appear in the Court's discussion of (1) the rela-
tionship of state tort remedies to federal remedies, (2) the na-
ture of the interest in reputation, and (3) the source of the
rights protected by the fourteenth amendment. This article
will examine the Court's rationale and its implications.
Paul v. Davis arose when the police chiefs of the City of
Louisville, Kentucky, and surrounding Jefferson County dis-
tributed a flyer to local merchants containing the names and
1. 96 S. Ct. 1155 (1976).
2. The Court also considered Mr. Davis's right of privacy, a question that will not
be dealt with here.
3. Section 1983 reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, or any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depri-
vation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
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